When the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) countries meet in Evian, France, June 1-3, a key item on their agenda will be the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction—their collective effort to keep nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons out of the hands of The Evian summit will give G8 countries the opportunity to take note of the progress made in the first year of the Global Partnership. More importantly, they will need to chart a course for the future of the initiative. This evaluation and agenda for future action will most likely take the form of a written statement, issued separately from the overall summit communiqué. Even before receiving the official report, however, it is possible to make some judgments about the partnership’s successes and challenges to The Global Partnership has contributed to a growing awareness worldwide that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a common threat faced by all countries. Moreover, the Global Partnership has strengthened global acceptance that all nations must share responsibility for addressing the threats, common to all of us, posed by these weapons. A significant measure of progress is that G8 participants have already pledged approximately $18 billion of the $20 billion target agreed at Kananaskis ($16 billion if Russia’s own $2 billion contribution is not counted in the total).*

…BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

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GP funds for chemical weapons destruction 2003

	Country	Funding for 2003
	United States	$171 million, $161 million for Shchuch’ye, $10 million for demilitarizing industrial sector
	Italy	$5 million
	Great Britain	$2.25 million
	Norway	$2.25 million
	Canada	$2.5 million
	Germany	$34.1 million, $27 million for Kambarka, $7.1 million for Gorny stage 2
	Netherlands	$2.5 million
	Switzerland	$13 million
		Total $233 million

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U.S Certification Waivers

Over the past decade, the United States has been the largest contributor to securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction in Russia—spending over $7 billion. U.S. Congressional provisions have required annual certification of Russia’s commitment to a series of arms control and other principles, in recent years, have added conditions specific to the Chemical Weapons (CW) destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. The CW-specific conditions have not been met for two years, but in 2003, for the first time, the U.S. Administration chose not to make the necessary certifications about Russia’s compliance with its chemical disarmament obligations. Without these certifications, construction of the Shchuch’ye facility ground to a halt, while failure to make the necessary certifications for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program blocked all new projects. In November 2002, the U.S. Congress, in separate actions, gave the U.S. President authority to waive certification requirements that had blocked $150 million to build the Schuch’ye CW destruction facility and $300 million in other CTR program spending. But the waiver authorities granted were temporary — one year in the case of Schuch’ye and three years for CTR. The U.S. Administration is now seeking legislation in FY 2004 that would make the waiver authorities permanent.

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An interview with the French Foreign Minister

A: The G8 partners have been working on the issues of nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction for many years, but these issues were given a new impetus last year in Kananaskis. The attacks of September 11 dramatically illuminated the urgency of reviving these initiatives, with the fight against the proliferation of WMDs and against terrorism being more closely linked than ever. The Global Partnership launched in Kananaskis is the concrete translation of the G8 countries’ joint commitment to nonproliferation. It is an innovative approach based on the pooling of  substantial financial resources among countries that do not have the same capabilities but largely share the same views of this threat and the need to face it together. This Partnership also marks the financial commitment that the international community is prepared to make on behalf of countries that are effectively dedicated to respecting the principles and regimes of nonproliferation.

A: The objective of our Presidency is to concretize the commitments made in Kananaskis. The Evian Summit must mark the transition from announced intentions to initial achievements. This is already largely the case when it comes to the financial commitment of the G8 partners. The $20 billion objective established at Kananaskis has largely been met, given that the contributions announced by the G8 countries currently amount to nearly $18 billion. These commitments, which demonstrate the G8 partners’ extremely active mobilization on this initiative, will be registered in Evian. Substantial progress has also been seen in the implementation of the guidelines defined in Kananaskis, which should make it possible to define a new framework for cooperation. With regard to cooperation projects, here too we have moved from the level of intentions to the conclusion of real projects. Most important, a large amount of funding—some 10 percent of the amounts pledged by the States for the 10 years to come, within the framework of this initiative—have been allocated in the 2003 budget, which is one of the most concrete signs of the projects’ state of advancement.

A: It is essential to further enhance the impetus given to outreach activities by Canada under the previous Presidency. In this regard, the concerted efforts of France, Canada and the United States have led to three meetings to mobilize new donors in Ottawa, Paris and Washington since the beginning of the year. We hope to report on concrete results in Evian, but theseefforts must continue beyond that date and through the end of the year, given that our presidency does not end with Evian. Several European countries that are already involved in cooperation and disarmament programs with Russia have expressed their wish to join the Global Partnership: That is notably the case for Norway and Poland. The Partnership must be open to new donors that have endorsed all the achievements of Kananaskis by adhering to its principles and guidelines, without establishing a minimum contribution. We hope to continue this dialogue with potential donors, who are prepared to develop concrete cooperation projects that fall within the scope of this initiative, and who have expressed their interest through a letter of intention. The recognition of these new donors and the announcement of their contributions to the Partnership could be made during the Evian Summit.

A: France has indeed pledged to contribute $750 million during the 10 years of the Global Partnership and in its 2003 and 2004 budgets has already allocated the amounts needed to launch them first cooperative projects. These relate to the dismantling of Russian nuclear submarines and assistance in the destruction of chemical weapons. France will also take part in programs to dismantle and secure radioactive sources, in studies to improve the security of fissile materials at certain sites, and in ensuring the security of certain pathogenic biological strains used for research. France also attributes great importance to the program eliminating excess Russian military plutonium. This program, whose credibility on the technical level has already been proven, is completely compatible with the threat reduction effort implemented by the G8 Global Partnership.

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The purpose of the guidelines agreed at Kananaskis was to clear away obstacles that had arisen in Russia on such questions as taxation, liability, and facility access, and to remedy the uneven treatment that different contributing countries had received on these questions in their negotiations with Russia. In this connection, the U.S.-Russia Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement (which has not been ratified by the Duma but has been applied provisionally for several years) was widely seen as a good model, although the Russians believe this agreement was negotiated at a time when their bargaining position was weak and are now reluctant to use it as a model.

Much of the recent attention on guidelines-related issues has focused on the negotiation of an agreement governing the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia (MNEPR). The MNEPR agreement—which was signed in Stockholm on May 21, 2003 by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK, the U.S., the EU, and EURATOM—deals with environmentally sensitive nuclear issues such as the dismantling of nuclear submarines, nuclear reactor safety, and the handling of radioactive wastes. As required by the Global Partnership guidelines, assistance under the MNEPR agreement was totally exempted from taxation. Through a separate protocol attached to the agreement, most MNEPR signatories agreed that certain exceptions would be made in granting liability protections to contributing country personnel and contractors. The United States, which enjoys exemption from liability under the CTR Umbrella Agreement, did not regard the MNEPR liability protocol as adequate and thus signed the MNEPR basic agreement but is not a party to the liability protocol. Before participating in MNEPR projects, the United States will have to work out a new protocol with the Russians covering liability.

To carry the Global Partnership forward, the G8 decided to establish a Senior Officials Group (SOG) consisting of high-level officials who developed the joint statement that established the Global Partnership. The SOG has proven to be an effective vehicle for coordinating Global Partnership activities under the leadership first of Jim Wright, Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister, and now Salome Zourabichvili, Director of International and Strategic Affairs, SGDN, who assumed the role when France took the helm of the G8 in January 2003. It has met frequently since the Kananaskis summit, an indication if the priority attached to the Partnership by G8 governments. The senior rank of SOG members has often enabled them to speak authoritatively for their capitals and, in general, served to facilitate the work of the group. Many discussions in the SOG focused on the implementation guidelines agreed at Kananaskis, with the Russians defending the limits of their flexibility and several of their G8 colleagues appealing for stronger Russian efforts to overcome bureaucratic and other problems that, in their view, had become serious impediments to new projects and increased funding commitments. The SOG also served as a forum for discussing overall Global Partnership priorities, considering the question of expanding participation to include non-G8 countries, notifying partners of new projects and funding pledges, and preparing for the Evian summit. Given the effectiveness of the SOG, it is likely to continue into the U.S. G8 presidency in 2004.

Russia has been anxious to begin new projects under the banner of the Global Partnership. To facilitate this, Russia has submitted a list of potential projects to other participants in the Global Partnership. These proposals are mainly in the two areas that President Putin has emphasized as Russian priorities—the dismantlement of decommissioned general-purpose nuclear submarines and the destruction of chemical weapons (CW). But Russia’s partners have resisted new project commitments in the absence of workable solutions on a number of controversial implementation issues. For example, British projects for submarine dismantlement and spent nuclear fuel disposal—in which the UK expressed interest as far back as December 2001—have been stalled due to lack of agreement on liability protections. Signature and ratification of the MNEPR agreement (see "Implementation Guidelines and the MNEPR Agreement" on page 2) will allow these projects to go forward.

Consequently, projects carried out under prior agreements made the best headway over the last year. Particular progress was made in CW destruction, mainly under Russian agreements with Germany and the United States.

In the realm of submarine dismantlement there have been significant events as well including:

Parliamentary actions, from clearing legal hurdles to appropriating new funds, are critical to the success of the Global Partnership. During the past year, Parliaments, especially in Russia and the United States, were actively engaged on Global Partnership-related issues.

In February 2003, the Russian Duma established a working group to review existing Russian laws relevant to Global Partnership activities in Russia and to consider new legislation that would govern such activities in the future. Some Russian legislators would like to enact a new Russian law that would provide a standardized approach to the full range of Global Partnership implementation issues and replace the patchwork of ad hoc arrangements that have been negotiated with various contributors. The working group, headed by Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Head of the Duma’s Defense Committee, will examine the issues of taxation, liability, access, and other controversial implementation matters that contributing countries believe have impeded the GP. Any new legislation would be introduced in the Duma toward the end of 2003 at the earliest. The Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, has begun a similar process of legislative review.

In November 2002, the U.S. Congress, in separate actions, gave the U.S. President authority to waive certification requirements that had blocked $150 million to build the Schuch’ye CW destruction facility and $300 million in CTR program spending. But the waiver authorities granted were temporary — one year in the case of Schuch’ye and three years for CTR. The U.S. Administration is now seeking legislation in FY 2004 that would make the waiver authorities permanent.

In April 2003, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar sought but failed to win Congressional support for allowing the U.S. Defense Department to spend up to $50 million in non-obligated CTR funds for threat reduction projects outside the former Soviet Union as part of the Iraq war supplemental bill. Supporters of expanding threat reduction assistance beyond the FSU will continue their efforts in other FY 04 legislation. Hearings on GP-related programs were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July and October 2002 and by the House International Relations Committee in May 2003.

Hearings on the Global Partnership were also held in Canada, Germany, and Norway. Notably, the Canadian Finance Minister John Manley incorporated Canada’s Global Partnership pledge into the federal government budget when he presented it to the House of Commons on February 18, 2003 - the adoption of which made Canada the first parliament to make a specific ten-year commitment to the Global Partnership.¨

The Strengthening the Global Partnership Project is a consortium of 20 influential policy research organizations in Asia, Europe, and North America that have joined together to promote the principles of the Group of 8 (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Nuclear Threat Initiative and Carnegie Corporation of New York are the primary sponsors of this three-year project, begun in late 2001.

Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership

Robert J. Einhorn and Michèle A. Flournoy, project directors

The growing threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has galvanized international attention. In June 2002, the G-8 announced the creation of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, pledging to raise up to $20 billion to address that threat. To advance this initiative, an international consortium of research institutions has collaborated to assess global efforts to account for, secure, and dismantle nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, agents, materials, and infrastructure, as well as to help former weapon scientists and specialists reintegrate into civilian work. In this, the resulting, four-volume study, the consortium has produced the most comprehensive analysis of international threat reduction programs to date. This is the first study that brings together donors and recipients of threat reduction assistance to make joint, actionable recommendations to promote and expand the goals of the Global Partnership to make the world safer. The report is available at www.sgpproject.org